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is a great institutional danger, especially
in the military profession, where free
thinking, combined with robust debate,
is the essential prerequisite for not being
outthought and outfought by future foes.
Almost as dangerous as intellectual
thuggery is willful ignorance of “unpleasant truths” or empirical evidence.
This was illustrated most notoriously
by Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus’s
recent a priori policy decision, made
in the fashion of Alice in Wonderland’s
Red Queen (“Sentence first, verdict
afterwards!”), to open all ground combat
positions to women regardless of any
data that might result subsequently
from the Marine Corps’s rigorous
yearlong study regarding the performance of mixed-gender units. That
sort of thing corrosively undermines
the institutional trust essential to the
success of any military organization.
Pussycats doubtless is controversial.
However, van Creveld’s arguments are
coherent and intellectually substantive,
even if one may disagree with some of
the assumptions he makes to support
them. Because they explicitly address
the most fundamental criterion for
assessing military forces—their combat
effectiveness—they are very worth
pondering by serving military officers
and civilian policy makers, especially
those more senior. Certainly the question of why Western military might, in
conjunction with the other elements
of state power, has not been more
effective during the past half-century
is a crucial one, given the multiple
dangerous challenges the West confronts
both today and over the longer term.
JAN VAN TOL
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Assessing China’s Naval Power: Technological Innovation, Economic Constraints, and Strategic Implications, by Sarah Kirchberger. Berlin: SpringerVerlag, 2015. 318 pages. $129.

Few recent works on the Chinese navy
have arrived with a more intriguing pedigree than this volume. It is
unusual to find any in-depth work on
the Chinese military being done by
European researchers. Assessing China’s
Naval Power, the product of a German
academic and released by a respected
European publisher, is essentially unique
in the field. Further, the author comes
at the problem with a diverse résumé,
having applied her academic training
in East Asian politics as an analyst with
the German shipbuilder Blohm + Voss.
Despite these selling points, the work
fails to deliver an original or compelling
view of the fast-changing Chinese
People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN).
Dr. Kirchberger sets out to create
an objective and largely materialist
yardstick by which to measure Chinese
naval development. While dealing
briefly with issues of policy and strategy,
she notes that matériel “defines the upper limit of what is achievable through
naval strategy.” As she seeks objective
comparisons, Kirchberger uses other
Asian and the so-called BRIC (Brazil,
Russia, India, China) navies as the
benchmark for “normal” naval development. While interesting, this effort to
quantify the analysis results in a strained
attempt to extract meaning from what
is quantifiable from available sources.
As an example, in one vignette Kirchberger compares Asian naval forces
with the total areas of the exclusive
economic zones (EEZs) their nations
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claim. The result suggests that China has
an average level of patrol-capable vessels,
but that the PLAN submarine force, at
one submarine per 35,716.75 square
kilometers of EEZ, is comparatively
large. It is tempting to critique such an
approach on the details: the figure used
for China’s EEZ is smaller than the scope
of its expansive maritime claims; and
administration of maritime claims in
China is a function of its rapidly growing
coast guard and maritime militia (not
explicitly included), whereas for many
of the other nations analyzed the navy
performs law-enforcement functions.
More significant is the irrelevance of the
figures themselves. By that yardstick,
the U.S. Navy (not included in this
analysis) defends one of the world’s
largest EEZs with a paltry one submarine per 210,000 square kilometers of
EEZ. Navies are developed for strategic
purposes, which vary from case to case.
Additionally, the focus on comparing
the PLAN with developing nations’
navies ignores the fact that one of the
driving combat tasks for the PLAN
is countering USN presence in Asia.
Taking the U.S. Navy as a yardstick for
Chinese naval development matters
because it is the yardstick the Chinese
themselves have set. That does not mean
the PLAN needs or desires to emulate
USN force structure in detail, but
considering both sides of a two-sided
interaction is critical to understanding.
More interesting is Kirchberger’s analysis
of China’s shipbuilding capabilities.
Drawing on her experience in the
shipbuilding industry, Kirchberger
assesses that the Chinese civil shipbuilding industry, though massive, offers few
advantages in the production of naval
combatants. In the critical maritime
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electronic sector, the book argues
that the European arms embargo and
centralized Chinese state control have
stymied most meaningful innovation.
Chinese combatants are presented as
collections of imported and copied
systems, with the assumption that the
systems-integration problems such a
model implies significantly hamper
their combat performance. The Chinese
decision to purchase the Russian-made
Sovremenny-class destroyer and
Kilo-class submarine in the middle of
the previous decade is seen as a tacit
admission of systemic deficiencies in
Chinese maritime systems development. However, Kirchberger arguably
underestimates China’s success at both
systems integration and adaptation
of foreign technologies. For example,
China received limited numbers of
Russian-manufactured MINERAL
ME radars and reverse engineered
them with enough success that they
now are deployed on every Jiangkai
II frigate produced. Kirchberger
dismisses these systems as poor copies.
While an earnest effort, at its heart this
volume fails on its sources. Dependent
on other secondary, primarily Englishlanguage, works, it contains few if any
references to Chinese-language sources.
As the volume was published in 2015,
most of these sources are from 2013
and prior. For example, Kirchberger’s
most consequential conclusions about
the PLAN submarine force hinge on a
2007 analysis of PLAN patrol activity
during the prior decade. The result
is a view of the Chinese navy that
arguably is accurate as of about 2010,
but that does not account for the rapid
changes in the scope and complexity
of PLAN platforms, capabilities, and
operations in the intervening years.
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Given the relatively small number of
academics doing serious analysis of the
PLAN, the introduction of a new point
of view is always to be welcomed. In
this case, however, naval professionals
interested in Chinese naval development
would be served better by going directly
to the sources behind this volume.
DALE C. RIELAGE

Deng Xiaoping’s Long War: The Military Conflict between China and Vietnam, 1979–1991, by
Xiaoming Zhang. Chapel Hill: Univ. of North
Carolina Press, 2015. 296 pages. $34.95 (e-book
$33.99).

This book will be welcomed equally
by historians, political scientists, and
international relations specialists. It is
a worthy addition to existing literature
and belongs on any bookshelf dedicated
to understanding modern China and
Southeast Asia. Xiaoming Zhang, an
associate professor in the Department
of Strategy at the Air War College, has
provided valuable additional information and analysis concerning the People’s
Republic of China’s invasion of Vietnam
in 1979. The Chinese invasion was
planned deliberately and analytically,
then for nearly a month the People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) fought fiercely
against China’s neighbor and former
ally. At the end of this period, the two
countries settled into a continuing active
and deadly border dispute that lasted
a decade. Taking advantage of recently
declassified Chinese documents and an
impressive number of interviews, Dr.
Zhang has advanced significantly our
understanding of why the Chinese chose
to initiate the somewhat Orwelliansounding “counterattack in self-defense
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against Vietnam,” how the war was
conducted, and why the subsequent
conflict along the VietnameseChinese border lasted so long.
As the history of the conflict unfolds,
Deng Xiaoping becomes more and
more the central figure and key Chinese
decision maker. By the conclusion of the
book, Dr. Zhang presents a convincing
case that the war of 1979 was indeed
Deng’s war—a war into which he entered
as much to preserve and promote his
plans for economic modernization as to
affect the balance of power in the international political system, while simultaneously aiming to rehabilitate and start
the process of modernizing the PLA.
The book explains how the recent North
Vietnamese victory over the Americans
and the South Vietnamese had a surprisingly deleterious effect on Vietnam’s
previously amiable and long-term alliance with China. Flushed with victory
and boasting a hardened and wellequipped army, the Vietnamese became,
to Chinese eyes, increasingly arrogant
and unfriendly. Vietnam’s invasion of
Cambodia and its deepening friendship
with the Soviet Union led Deng to see
China’s position as potentially imperiled,
threatened by the USSR to the north
and the Vietnamese to the south. In
particular, the invasion of Cambodia
in December 1978 was viewed as proof
of Hanoi’s ambition to make Vietnam a
hegemonic power in Southeast Asia, and
added significantly to Deng’s concerns.
Deng, who already had determined that
economic and industrial modernization
was the way ahead for China, arrived
at an apparently counterintuitive
conclusion. Significant combat operations conducted against Vietnam, the
Soviet Union’s most important regional
ally, would signal to the United States
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